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Design science research has been well-established research as a paradigm within information systems (IS) for at least a decade (March & Storey 2008). It has had a powerful
impact on the discipline. Its roots, however, were firmly anchored in decision theory
long before IS refined our version of it. Even the name, ‘design science research’ was
coined in a decision support journal (viz., March & Smith 1995). However, the most
fundamental source of the decision-oriented influence on IS design science research has
been Herbert A. Simon’s classic work, The Sciences of the Artificial (1996), especially the
chapter on “The Science of Design: Creating The Artificial”.
Simon was a Nobel Prize winning researcher in decision-making. It is highly unlikely that any study of computers in management can achieve any depth without encountering Simon’s work, or at least derivations of his thinking about the subject. His
conceptualization of management decisions and human rationality are standard fare
on the intellectual menu for MBA students worldwide. Perhaps Simon’s most widely
known ideas are his three-stage model of decision-making, the conditioning of such
decisions by the bounded rationality of the decision-maker and, at least in IS circles,
the sciences of the artificial. Of course, he was a prolific and long-lived scholar who
made many significant contributions beyond these three, but these three have become
significantly interconnected for the IS field, especially in our design science research.
Simon wrote extensively about models of decision-making. He introduced his three
stage model as follows,
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Executives spend a large fraction of their time surveying the economic, technical,
political, and social environment to identify new conditions that call for new
actions. They probably spend an even larger fraction of their time, individually
or with their associates, seeking to invent, design, and develop possible courses
of action for handling situations where a decision is needed. They spend a small
fraction of their time in choosing among alternative actions already developed
to meet an identified problem and already analysed for their consequences. The
three fractions, added together, account for most of what executives do.

The first phase of the decision-making process —searching the environment for
conditions calling for decision—I shall call intelligence activity (borrowing the
military meaning of intelligence). The second phase —inventing, developing,
and analysing possible courses of action—I shall call design activity. The third
phase—selecting a particular course of action from those available—I shall call
choice activity. (Simon 1960, p. 2 emphasis from original)
These three stages have a longer history than Simon’s formulation: They are “closely related to the stages in problem solving first described by John Dewey: What is the problem? What are the alternatives? Which alternative is best?” (Simon 1960, p. 3) Further,
the stages are not necessarily linear.
The division of the decision-making process into such subprocesses as setting the
agenda, representing the problem, finding alternatives, and selecting alternatives
has sometimes been criticized as describing decision-making falsely as a ‘linear’
process, and thereby rigidifying it. Of course there is no implication in anything
that we have said that these subprocesses must follow in a set order. Agenda-setting—and resetting—is a continual process, as is the search for new decision alternatives (e.g., new products), and the selection of alternatives as new occasions
for decisions arise. An alternative discovered in one decision process may find
its effective application at some much later time and in connection with a quite
different decision. (Simon 1997, p. 145)
While it is not possible to do justice to this model in a few short pages, even the briefest
of introductions must recognize that Simon conditioned his model with the bounded
rationality available in the decision maker. Individuals and organizations are limited
by their collective knowledge, their cognitive abilities, and their available resources.
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Individuals will have limited knowledge, limited cognitive abilities, and limited computational power (Simon 1972). These boundaries on rationality in decision making
effectively makes any determination of an optimal solution unlikely. Instead, decision
makers must be satisfied with a solution that is probably suboptimal, but sufficiently
satisfactory to be practical. Decisions will only satisfice; they satisfy the aspirations represented by the problem definition. When the decision results achieve the aspirations,
there is satisfaction. When the aspirations exceed the decision results, there is dissatisfaction (cf. Simon 1996, p. 30).
For our purposes, we will leave aside the intelligence and choice stages and focus on
the design stage. Design involves discovery, while choice involves comparisons:
…classical decision theory has been concerned with choice among given alternatives; design is concerned with the discovery and elaboration of alternatives.
… The evaluations and comparisons that take place during this design process
are not, in general comparisons among complete designs. Evaluations take place,
first of all, to guide the search [, to] provide the basis for decisions that the designs should be elaborated in one direction rather than another. (Simon 1972,
p. 172).
Constrained by bounded rationality, designing courses of action is a discovery process.
One searches for a course of action until one (or very few) is found that satisfies the
aspirations. Never mind optimal, it is sufficient if the design works. This means that the
search involves synthesis of possible solutions and the aspirations; it therefore involves a
kind of testing or matching as to whether each or any of the possible solutions encountered provides a satisficing treatment of the aspirations:
Designing courses of action introduces an important asymmetry between the
“goal-like” constraints that guide synthesis and the constraints that test potential
solutions. In general, the search will continue until one decision in the feasible
set is found, or, at most, a very few alternatives. Which member of the set is
discovered and selected may depend critically on the order of search, that is, on
which requirements serve as generators and which as tests. (Simon 1960, p. 174)
This conceptualization of design as a search process carries forward into Simon’s ideas
about design in the sciences of the artificial. While IS design researchers often operate
in general terms using design principles or design theory, Simon was more interested in
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design logic as a way to discover alternatives. This logic involves a means-ends analysis,
which can be illustrated by the logic of the General Problem Solver (GPS):
[The GPS] must be able to represent desired situations or desired objects as well
as the present situation. It must be able also to represent differences between
the desired and the present. [The GPS] must be able to represent actions that
change objects or situations. To behave purposefully, [it] must be able to select
from time to time those particular actions that are likely to remove the particular
differences between desired and present states that the system detects. (Simon
1996, p. 122)
There is an incrementalism in Simon’s design search process. Early design decisions
set more abstract boundaries on later design decisions. In complex settings, these early
decisions must be made in the presence of more incomplete information, hence the
abstract nature. These early decisions must be elaborated, and the elaborations then
evaluated against the design aspirations.
In the design of complex objects—a bridge, say, or an airplane—the process has
an even more involved search structure. Here, the early stages of search take place
in highly simplified spaces that abstract most of the detail from the real-world
problem, leaving only its most important elements in summarized form. When
a plan, a schematized and aggregated design, has been elaborated in the planning
space, the detail of the problem can be reintroduced, and the plan used as a guide
in the search for a complete design. (Simon 1972, p. 172)
Problem solving is often described as a search through a vast maze of possibilities, a maze that describes the environment. Successful problem solving involves
searching the maze selectively and reducing it to manageable proportions. (Simon 1996, p. 54)
Like the model of decision-making, the logic of design is not a linear process. The selection for new design alternatives may arise in new occasions. An alternative discovered,
but unused in an earlier design decision may be applied later (cf., Simon 1997, p. 145).
Such non-linearity allows the opportunity to retrace to an early, more abstract design
decision when it fails to yeild a satisfaction of aspirations as the design becomes less
abstract (Simon 1972). When you are part way down a design path and things are not
working, you can back up to a previous alternative selection and reconsider it.
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The search for new decision alternatives (e.g., new products), and the selection of
alternatives as new occasions for decisions arise. An alternative discovered in one
decision process may find its effective application at some much later time and
in connection with a quite different decision. (Simon 1997, p. 145)
The main critiques of the science of design revolve around its “positivist, technical-rationality basis” although it “could form a fundamental, common ground of intellectual
endeavour and communication across the arts, sciences and technology” (Cross 1982,
p. 4). However, the strongest criticism is aimed at the developments of a design science
independent of the sciences of the artificial:
…the science of design is the study of design—something similar to what I have
elsewhere defined as ‘design methodology’; the study of the principles, practices
and procedures of design. ... The study of design leaves open the interpretation
of the nature of design. So let me suggest here that the science of design refers
to that body of work which attempts to improve our understanding of design
through ‘scientific’ (i.e., systematic, reliable) methods of investigation. And let us
be clear that a ‘science of design’ is not the same as a ‘design science’. … design
science refers to an explicitly organised, rational and wholly systematic approach
to design; not just the utilisation of scientific knowledge of artefacts, but design
in some sense a scientific activity itself. (Cross 1982, p. 3-4)
It is difficult to separate the study of a practice in a professional school without the
expectation that such studies will not infect the future practice in the profession. Much
of Simon’s work around decision-making and design is indeed intensely analytical and
focused on rational and rather economic behavior. This viewpoint is decidedly academic. In practice, however, both decision-making and design inevitably have to have a
creative element in practice.
Yet, a very large part of the managerial effort in any organization is devoted to
discovering possible alternatives of action. To take some obvious examples, there
is search for new products, for new marketing methods, for new manufacturing
methods, even for new organization structures. All of this search activity is aimed
at enabling the organization to go beyond actions that are already known and
understood and to choose novel ones. (Simon 1997, p. 145)
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A deep source of communication difficulty between the discipline-oriented and
the practice-oriented members of a professional school faculty stems from the
difference between science and art, between analysis and synthesis, between explanation and design. The pure scientist wishes to explain phenomena in nature;
the practitioner wishes to devise actions or processes or physical structures that
serve some specified purpose.
Analysis leading to explanation is generally thought to be itself susceptible of
analysis and systemization, hence to be teachable. Synthesis aimed at design is
generally thought to be intuitive, judgmental, not fully explicit, hence an art.
Medicine, engineering, management, teaching are arts. (Simon 1997, p. 373)
This early acknowledgement of the art in engineering and management (and thus IS)
does not contradict Simon’s highly analytical discourse on design, nor is it even a concession. It incorporates the generative element of synthesis as a logical means for achieving an effective design. He rejects as “mischievous” the castigation that “utility is the
only touchstone of relevance” in professional schools (Simon 1997, p. 366). Even a
decision or a design logic can be intellectually and aesthetically challenging. The result
of developments like a science of design should be “teachable doctrine”.
The artificial world is centered precisely on this interface between the inner and
outer environments; it is concerned with attaining goals by adapting the former
to the latter. The proper study of those who are concerned with the artificial is
the way in which that adaptation of means to environments is brought about
and central to that is the process of design itself. The professional schools can
reassume their professional responsibilities just to the degree that they discover
and teach a science of design, a body of intellectually tough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process. (Simon
1996, p. 113)
So we cannot assume that the science of design is only intended as a descriptive study of
how design unfolds. As teachable doctrine, it is also intended as a way for professionals
to go about designing. It is a way that is partly science, partly art. Ultimately it is part of
a consistent scheme for deciding and designing, one that invokes logic, analysis, science
and method wherever possible. At the same time, it is one that also invokes synthesis
and the aesthetics of generative productions wherever possible.
Yes, in some sense, the science of design is a scientific approach to design: utilitarian,
analytically tough and formal. In this sense, it is hard to distinguish from notions of a
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design science. But in Simon’s writings, this is only one of its senses. In another sense
the science of design is aesthetically synthetic and artistically generated. Descended
from decision theory, and like decision theory, it is partly science, partly art. Likewise
design science research in IS: scientific when it can be, creative when it must be.
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